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 Zika virus (ZIKV) is causing an unprecedented epidemic linked to severe congenital syndromes1,2. 56 
In July 2016, mosquito-borne ZIKV transmission was reported in the continental United States and 57 
since then, hundreds of locally-acquired infections have been reported in Florida3,4. To gain insights 58 
into the timing, source, and likely route(s) of ZIKV introduction, we tracked the virus from its first 59 
detection in Florida by sequencing ZIKV genomes from infected patients and Aedes aegypti 60 
mosquitoes. We show that at least four introductions, but potentially as many as 40, contributed to 61 
the outbreak in Florida and that local transmission likely started in the spring of 2016 - several 62 
months before initial detection. By analyzing surveillance and genetic data, we discovered that 63 
ZIKV moved among transmission zones in Miami. Our analyses show that most introductions are 64 
linked to the Caribbean, a finding corroborated by the high incidence rates and traffic volumes 65 
from the region into the Miami area. Our study provides an understanding of how ZIKV initiates 66 
transmission in new regions. 67 
ZIKV transmission in the Americas was first reported in Brazil in May 20155, though the virus was likely 68 
introduced 1-2 years prior to its detection6–8. By January 2016, ZIKV cases were reported from several 69 
South and Central American countries and most islands in the Caribbean9. Like dengue virus (DENV) and 70 
chikungunya virus (CHIKV), ZIKV is vectored primarily by Aedes mosquitoes10–13. The establishment of 71 
the peridomestic species Ae. aegypti in the Americas14 has facilitated DENV, CHIKV, and now likely 72 
ZIKV to become endemic in this region15. In the continental United States, transient outbreaks of DENV 73 
and CHIKV have been reported in regions of Texas and Florida4,16–21 with abundant seasonal Ae. aegypti 74 
populations14,22. 75 
The 2016 ZIKV outbreak in Florida generated 256 confirmed ZIKV infections4 (Fig. 1a). While 76 
transmission was confirmed across four counties in Florida (Fig. 1b), the outbreak was most intense in 77 
Miami-Dade County (241 infections). Although the case location could not always be determined, at least 78 
114 (47%) infections were likely acquired in one of three distinct transmission zones: Wynwood, Miami 79 
Beach, and Little River (Fig. 1c-d). 80 
Using mosquito surveillance data, we determined the extent of mosquito-borne ZIKV transmission in 81 
Miami. Of the 24,351 mosquitoes collected from June to November 2016, 99.8% were Ae. aegypti and 8 82 
pools of ≤ 50 mosquitoes tested positive for ZIKV (Fig. 1c, Extended Data Fig. 1). From these pools, we 83 
estimated that ~1 out of 1,600 Ae. aegypti mosquitoes were infected (0.061%, 95% CI: 0.028-0.115%, 84 
Extended Data Fig. 1a). This is similar to infection rates during DENV and CHIKV outbreaks23. Although 85 
we did not detect ZIKV-infected mosquitoes outside Miami Beach (Fig. 1c), we found that the number of 86 
human ZIKV cases correlated strongly with Ae. aegypti abundance within each transmission zone 87 
(Spearman r = 0.61, Fig. 1d, Extended Data Fig. 1b). This suggests that Ae. aegypti mosquitoes were the 88 
primary mode of transmission and that changes to vector abundance impacted human infection rates. We 89 
found that the application of insecticides3 suppressed mosquito populations during periods of intensive 90 
usage (Extended Data Fig. 1c), and therefore likely contributed to ZIKV clearance. 91 
We sequenced 39 ZIKV genomes from clinical and mosquito samples without cell culture24 92 
(Supplementary Table 1a). Our ZIKV dataset included 29 genomes from patients with locally-acquired 93 
infections (Fig. 1d) and 7 from Ae. aegypti pools (Fig. 1c). We also sequenced 3 ZIKV genomes from 94 
travel-associated cases from Florida. Our dataset included cases from all transmission zones in Miami 95 
(Fig. 1d) and represented ~11% of all confirmed locally-acquired cases in Florida. We made all sequence 96 
data openly available (PRJNA342539, PRJNA356429) immediately after data generation. 97 
We reconstructed phylogenetic trees from our ZIKV genomes along with 65 published genomes from 98 
other affected regions (Fig. 2, Extended Data Fig. 2 and 3). We found that the Florida ZIKV genomes 99 
formed four distinct lineages (labeled F1-F4, Fig. 2a), three of which (F1-F3) belonged to the same clade 100 
(labeled A, Fig. 2a). We only sampled a single human case each from the F3 and F4 lineages, consistent 101 
 with limited transmission (Fig. 2a). The other two Florida lineages (F1-F2) comprised ZIKV genomes 102 
from human and mosquito samples within Miami-Dade County (Fig. 2b). 103 
Using time-structured phylogenies25, we estimated that at least four separate introductions were 104 
responsible for the locally-acquired cases observed in our dataset. The phylogenetic placement of lineage 105 
F4 clearly indicates that it resulted from an independent introduction of a lineage distinct from those in 106 
clade A (Fig. 2a). For the two well-supported nodes linking lineages F1-F2 (labeled B, Fig. 2a) and F1-F3 107 
(A, Fig. 2a), we estimated the time of the most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) to be during the 108 
summer of 2015 (95% highest posterior density [HPD]: June-September, 2015). Our data displayed a 109 
strong clock signal (Extended Data Fig. 2b) and tMRCA estimates were robust across a range of models 110 
(Extended Data Table 1a). Thus while F1-F3 belong to clade A, any fewer than three distinct 111 
introductions leading to these lineages would have required undetected transmission of ZIKV in Florida 112 
for approximately one year (Fig. 2a). 113 
To estimate the likelihood of a single ZIKV transmission chain persisting for over a year, we modeled 114 
spread under different assumptions of the basic reproductive number (R0). Using the number of locally-115 
acquired and travel-associated cases, along with the number of observed genetic lineages, we estimated an 116 
R0 between 0.5 and 0.8 in Miami-Dade County (Extended Data Fig. 4).Even at the upper end of this 117 
range, the probability of a single transmission chain persisting for over a year is extremely low (~0.5%, 118 
Fig. 2c). This is especially true considering the low Ae. aegypti abundance during the winter months 119 
(Extended Data Fig. 1d).  120 
Given the low probability of long-term persistence, we expect that our ZIKV genomes (F1-F4) were the 121 
result of at least four introductions. Differences in surveillance practices and a high number of travel-122 
associated cases (Fig. 1a), however, likely mean that unsampled ZIKV introductions also contributed to 123 
the outbreak. To estimate the total number of ZIKV introductions, we modeled scenarios that resulted in 124 
241 locally-acquired cases within Miami-Dade County, and found that with R0 values of 0.5-0.8, we 125 
expect 17-42 (95% CI 3-63) separate introductions to have contributed to the outbreak (Fig. 2d). The 126 
majority of these introductions would likely have generated a single secondary case that was undetected 127 
in our genetic sampling (Extended Data Fig. 4a). Incorporating under-reporting in a sensitivity analysis 128 
increases R0 estimates slightly to 0.7-0.9 (Extended Data Fig. 4f-i). 129 
The two main ZIKV lineages, F1 and F2, included the majority of genomes from Florida (92%, Fig. 2a). 130 
Assuming they represent two independent introductions, we estimated when each of these lineages 131 
arrived in Florida. The probability densities for the tMRCAs of both F1 and F2 were centered around 132 
March-April, 2016 (Fig. 2b, 95% HPD: January-May, 2016). The estimated timing for these introductions 133 
corresponds with suitable Ae. aegypti populations in Miami-Dade County26 (Extended Data Fig. 1d) and 134 
suggests that ZIKV transmission could have started at least two months prior to its detection in July 2016 135 
(Fig. 1a). The dates of the introductions could be more recent if multiple F1 or F2 lineage viruses arrived 136 
independently. However, more than 2 introductions would be necessary to substantially change our 137 
estimates for the timing of the earliest introduction. 138 
To understand transmission dynamics within Miami, we analyzed our genomic data together with case 139 
data from the Florida Department of Health (DOH, Supplementary Table 1a). While spatially distinct, the 140 
three ZIKV transmission zones occurred within ~5 km of each other (Fig. 1c) and we found that the 141 
ZIKV infections associated with each zone overlapped temporally (Fig. 1d). Our ZIKV genomes with 142 
zone assignments all belonged to lineages F1 and F2, but neither of these lineages were confined to a 143 
single zone (Fig. 2b). In fact, we detected both F1 and F2 lineage viruses from Ae. aegypti collected from 144 
the same trap 26 days apart (mosquitoes 5 and 8, Fig. 2b). These findings suggest that ZIKV moved 145 
among areas of Miami. 146 
 Determining the sources and routes of ZIKV introductions could help mitigate future outbreaks. We 147 
found that lineages F1-F3 clustered with ZIKV genomes sequenced from the Dominican Republic and 148 
Guadeloupe (Fig. 2, Extended Data Fig. 2 and 3). In contrast, F4 clustered with genomes from Central 149 
America (Fig. 2, Extended Data Fig. 2 and 3). These findings suggest that while ZIKV outbreaks occurred 150 
throughout the Americas, the Caribbean islands were the main source of establishing local ZIKV 151 
transmission in Florida. Because of severe undersampling of ZIKV genomes, however, we cannot rule out 152 
other source areas. Similarly, even though we found that the Florida ZIKV genomes clustered together 153 
with sequences from the Dominican Republic, our results do not prove that ZIKV entered Florida from 154 
this country.  155 
We investigated ZIKV infection rates and travel patterns to corroborate our phylogenetic evidence for 156 
Caribbean introductions. We found that the Caribbean islands bore the highest ZIKV incidence rates (Fig. 157 
2b), despite Brazil and Colombia reporting the highest absolute number of cases (January to June, 2016, 158 
Fig. 3a, Extended Data Fig. 5, Supplementary Table 1b). During the same time period, we estimated that 159 
~3 million travelers arrived from the Caribbean, accounting for 54% of the total traffic into Miami, with 160 
the vast majority (~2.4 million) arriving via cruise ships (Fig. 3b, Extended Data Fig. 6, Supplementary 161 
Table 1b). Combining the infection rates with travel capacities, we estimated that ~60-70% of ZIKV 162 
infected travelers arrived from the Caribbean (Fig. 3c and Extended Data Fig. 7a). We also found that the 163 
number of travel-associated ZIKV cases correlated strongly with the expected number of importations 164 
from the Caribbean (Spearman r = 0.8, Fig. 3d, Extended Data Fig. 7b). Finally, 67% of the travel-165 
associated infections in Florida reported recent travel to the Caribbean (Fig. 3e); however, their mode of 166 
travel is unknown. Taken together, these findings suggest that a high incidence of ZIKV in the Caribbean, 167 
combined with frequent travel, could have played a key role in the establishment of ZIKV transmission in 168 
Florida. These findings, however, do not indicate that cruise ships themselves are risk factors for human 169 
ZIKV infection, but only that they served as a major mode of transportation from areas with active 170 
transmission. In addition, ZIKV exposure may vary among individuals depending on their purpose of 171 
travel and therefore we cannot determine the specific contribution of ZIKV-infected travelers arriving via 172 
airlines or cruise ships. 173 
The majority of the Florida ZIKV outbreak occurred in Miami-Dade County (Fig. 1b). To determine if 174 
there is a higher potential for ZIKV outbreaks in this area, we analyzed incoming passenger traffic from 175 
regions with ZIKV transmission along with local Ae. aegypti abundance. We estimated that Miami and 176 
nearby Fort Lauderdale received ~72% of traffic (Fig. 4) and Miami received more air and sea traffic 177 
from ZIKV endemic areas than any other city in the United States (Extended Data Fig. 8). During January 178 
to April 2016, we estimated that Ae. aegypti abundance was highest in southern Florida22 (Fig. 4, 179 
Extended Data Fig. 1d, Extended Data Fig. 8). By June, most of Florida and several cities across the 180 
South likely supported high Ae. aegypti populations14,22 (Extended Data Fig. 8); however, most of this 181 
region has not reported local Ae. aegypti-borne virus transmission in at least 60 years19. In fact, the only 182 
region outside of Florida with local ZIKV transmission is southern Texas27, which is also the only other 183 
region with recent DENV outbreaks19–21. Therefore, the combination of travelers, mosquito ecology, and 184 
human population density likely make Miami one of the few places in the continental United States at risk 185 
for Ae. aegypti-borne virus outbreaks22,26,28. 186 
The extent of ZIKV transmission in Florida was unprecedented, with more reported ZIKV cases in 2016 187 
(256) than DENV cases since 2009 (136)4,16,17. This case difference may be reflected by lower incidence 188 
of endemic DENV than epidemic ZIKV in source countries29,30, resulting in fewer DENV importations 189 
(reported travel cases since 2009: 654 DENV and 1,016 ZIKV)4. Given that the majority of ZIKV 190 
infections are asymptomatic2,31, the true number of ZIKV cases was likely much higher. Despite this, we 191 
estimated that the average R0 was less than 1 and therefore multiple introductions were necessary to give 192 
rise to the observed outbreak32. The high volume of traffic entering Florida from ZIKV-affected regions, 193 
especially the Caribbean, likely provided a substantial supply of ZIKV-infected individuals33. Because 194 
 Florida is unlikely to sustain long-term ZIKV transmission32, the potential for future ZIKV outbreaks in 195 
this region is dependent upon activity elsewhere. Therefore, we expect that outbreaks in Florida will cycle 196 
with the ZIKV transmission dynamics in the Americas7,8,15. 197 
 198 
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 Figure Legends 236 
Figure 1 | Zika virus outbreak in Florida. (a) Weekly counts of confirmed travel-associated and 237 
locally-acquired ZIKV cases in 2016. (b) Four counties reported locally-acquired ZIKV cases in 2016: 238 
Miami-Dade (241), Broward (5), Palm Beach (8), Pinellas (1), and unknown origin (1). (c) The locations 239 
of mosquito traps and collected Ae. aegypti mosquitoes found to contain ZIKV RNA (ZIKV+) in relation 240 
to the transmission zones within Miami. (d) Temporal distribution of weekly ZIKV cases (left y-axis), 241 
sequenced cases (bottom), and Ae. aegypti abundance per trap night (right y-axis) associated with the 242 
three described transmission zones. ZIKV cases and sequences are plotted in relation to symptom onset 243 
dates (n=18). Sequenced cases without onset dates or that occurred outside of the transmission zones are 244 
not shown (n=10). Human cases and Ae. aegypti abundance per week were positively correlated 245 
(Spearman r = 0.61, Extended Data Fig. 1b). The maps were generated using open source basemaps34. 246 
 247 
Figure 2 | Multiple introductions of Zika virus into Florida. (a) Maximum clade credibility (MCC) 248 
tree of ZIKV genomes sequenced from outbreaks in the Pacific islands and the epidemic in the Americas. 249 
Tips are colored based on collection location. The five tips outlined in blue but filled with a different 250 
color indicate ZIKV cases in the United States associated with travel (fill color indicates the probable 251 
location of infection). Clade posterior probabilities are indicated by white circles filled with black relative 252 
to the level of support. The grey violin plot indicates the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) interval for 253 
the tMRCA for the epidemic in the Americas (AM). Lineage F4 contains two identical ZIKV genomes 254 
from the same patient. (b) A zoomed in version of the whole MCC tree showing the collection locations 255 
of Miami-Dade sequences and whether they were sequenced from mosquitoes (numbers correspond to 256 
trap locations in Fig. 1c). 95% HPD intervals are shown for the tMRCAs (c) The probability of ZIKV 257 
persistence after introduction for different R0. Persistence is measured as the number of days from initial 258 
introduction of viral lineages until their extinction. Vertical dashed lines show the inferred mean 259 
persistence time for lineages F1, F2 and B based on their tMRCA. (d) Total number of introductions 260 
(mean with 95% CI) that contributed to the outbreak of 241 local cases in Miami-Dade County for 261 
different R0. 262 
 263 
Figure 3 | Frequent opportunities for Zika virus introductions into Miami from the Caribbean. (a) 264 
Reported ZIKV cases per country/territory from January to June, 2016 normalized by total population. (b) 265 
The number of estimated travelers entering Miami during January to June, 2016 by method of travel. (c) 266 
The number of travelers and the reported ZIKV incidence rate for the country/territory of origin were 267 
used to estimate the proportion of infected travelers coming from each region with ZIKV in the Americas. 268 
(d) The observed number of weekly travel-associated ZIKV cases in Florida were plotted with the 269 
expected number of ZIKV-infected travelers (as estimated in panel c) coming from all of the Americas 270 
(grey line) and the regional contributions (colored areas). (e) The countries visited by the 1,016 travel-271 
associated ZIKV cases diagnosed in Florida. 272 
 273 
Figure 4 | Southern Florida has a high potential for Aedes aegypti-borne virus outbreaks. The 274 
estimated number of travelers per month (circles) entering Florida cities via flights and cruise ships were 275 
plotted with estimated relative Ae. aegypti abundance. Only cities receiving >10,000 passengers per 276 
month are shown. Relative Ae. aegypti abundance for every month is shown in Extended Data Fig. 1d. 277 
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 Methods 355 
Ethical statement 356 
This work was evaluated and approved by relevant Institutional Review Boards (IRB)/Ethics Review 357 
Committees at The Scripps Research Institute (TSRI) and the US Army Medical Research Institute of 358 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Office of Human Use and Ethics. This work was conducted as part of 359 
the public health response in Florida and samples were collected under a waiver of consent granted by the 360 
Florida DOH Human Research Protection Program. The work received a non-human subjects research 361 
designation (category 4 exemption) by the Florida DOH since this research was performed with leftover 362 
clinical diagnostic samples involving no more than minimal risk. All samples were deidentified prior to 363 
receipt by the study investigators. 364 
Florida Zika virus case data 365 
Weekly reports of international travel-associated and locally-acquired ZIKV infections diagnosed in 366 
Florida were obtained from the Florida DOH mosquito-borne disease surveillance system4. Dates of 367 
symptom onset from the Miami transmission zones (Wynwood, Miami Beach, and Little River) 368 
determined by the Florida DOH investigation process were obtained from the ZIKV resource website35 369 
and daily updates36. International travel-associated ZIKV case counts in the United States (outside of 370 
Florida) were obtained from the CDC37. The local and travel-associated ZIKV case numbers for Florida 371 
were obtained from the Florida DOH. The one local ZIKV infection diagnosed in Duval County was 372 
believed to have originated elsewhere in Florida. Therefore, this case is listed as “unknown origin” in Fig. 373 
1b. In Fig. 3e, only the countries visited by 5 or more times by ZIKV-infected travelers diagnosed in 374 
Florida are shown. Countries with 5 or fewer visits were aggregated into an “other” category by region 375 
(i.e., Caribbean, South America, or Central America). 376 
Clinical sample collection and RNA extraction 377 
Clinical samples from locally-acquired ZIKV infections were collected from June 22 to October 11, 2016. 378 
The Florida DOH identified persons with compatible illness and clinical samples were shipped to the 379 
Bureau of Public Health Laboratories for confirmation by qRT-PCR and antibody tests following interim 380 
guidelines3,38–40. Clinical specimens (whole blood, serum, saliva, or urine) submitted for analysis were 381 
refrigerated or frozen at ≤ -70°C until RNA was extracted. RNA was extracted using the RNAeasy kit 382 
(QIAGEN), MagMAX for Microarrays Total RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion), or MagNA Pure LC 2.0 or 96 383 
Systems (Roche Diagnostics). Purified RNA was eluted into 50-100 µL using the supplied elution 384 
buffers, immediately frozen at ≤ -70°C, and transported on dry ice. The Florida DOH also provided 385 
investigation data for these samples, including symptom onset dates and, when available, assignments to 386 
the zone where infection likely occurred (Supplementary Table 1).  387 
Mosquito collection, RNA extraction, and entomological data analysis 388 
24,351 Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus mosquitoes (sorted into 2,596 pools) were collected throughout 389 
Miami-Dade County during June to November, 2016 using BG-Sentinel mosquito traps (Biogents AG). 390 
Up to 50 mosquitoes of the same species and sex were pooled per trap. The pooled mosquitoes were 391 
stored in RNAlater (Invitrogen), RNA was extracted using either the RNAeasy kit (QIAGEN) or 392 
MagMAX for Microarrays Total RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion), and ZIKV RNA was detected by qRT-393 
PCR targeting the envelope protein coding region40 or the Trioplex qRT-PCR kit41. ZIKV infection rates 394 
were calculated per 1,000 female Ae. aegypti mosquitoes using the bias-corrected maximum likelihood 395 
estimate (MLE)42. Days of insecticide usage by the Miami-Dade Mosquito Control were inferred from the 396 
zone-specific ZIKV activities timelines published by the Florida DOH35. 397 
 Relative monthly Ae. aegypti abundance 398 
For the purpose of this study we used Ae. aegypti suitability maps from Kraemer et al.14 and derived 399 
monthly estimates based on the statistical relationships between mosquito presence and environmental 400 
correlates43. Following Hwang et al.44 we used a simple mathematical formula to transform the 401 
probability of detection maps into mosquito abundance maps. In order to do so, we assumed P (Y=1) 402 
where Y is a binary variable (presence/absence). Using a Poisson distribution X() to govern the 403 
abundance of mosquitoes, the probability of not observing any mosquitoes can be related to the 404 
probability of absence as: P(X=0)=P(Y=0). We used the following transformation to generate abundance 405 
(λ) estimates per county in Florida: 406 
݁ିఒ = ܲ(ܻ = 0) 
ߣ = 	− log൫ܲ(ܻ = 0)൯ 
ߣ = 	−log	(1 − ܲ(ܻ = 1) 
We did not consider Ae. albopictus abundance in this study because 99.8% of mosquitoes collected in 407 
Miami-Dade County were Ae. aegypti. Relative Ae. aegypti abundance in major U.S. cities presented in 408 
Extended Data Fig. 8 was estimated as previously described22. 409 
Zika virus quantification 410 
ZIKV genome equivalents (GE) were quantified by qRT-PCR. At TSRI, ZIKV qRT-PCR was performed 411 
as follows: ZIKV RNA standards were transcribed from the ZIKV NS5 region (8651-9498 nt) using the 412 
T7 forward primer (5’ - TAA TAC GAC TCA CTA TAG GGA GA TCA GGC TCC TGT CAA AAC 413 
CC - 3’), reverse primer (5’ - AGT GAC AAC TTG TCC GCT CC - 3’), and the T7 Megascript kit 414 
(Ambion). For qRT-PCR, primers and a probe targeting the NS5 region (9014-9123 nt) were designed 415 
using the ZIKV isolate PRVABC59 (GenBank: KU501215): forward primer (5’- AGT GCC AGA GCT 416 
GTG TGT AC - 3’), reverse primer (5’ - TCT AGC CCC TAG CCA CAT GT - 3’), and FAM-fluorescent 417 
probe (5’ - GGC AGC CGC GCC ATC TGG T - 3’). The qRT-PCR assays were performed in 25 μl 418 
reactions using the iScript One-step RT-PCR Kit for probes (Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc.) and 2 μl of 419 
sample RNA. Amplification was performed at 50°C for 20 min, 95°C for 3 min, and 40 cycles of 95°C 420 
for 10 s and 57°C for 10 s. Fluorescence was read at the end of the 57°C annealing-extension step. 10-fold 421 
dilutions of the ZIKV RNA transcripts (2 μl/reaction) were used to create a standard curve for 422 
quantification of ZIKV GE/μl of RNA. The lower limits of quantification are 4 GE/μl RNA, or at a cycle 423 
threshold of ~36. 424 
ZIKV GE were quantified at USAMRIID using the University of Bonn ZIKV envelope protein (Bonn E) 425 
qRT-PCR assay45. RNA standards were transcribed using an amplicon generated from a ZIKV plasmid 426 
containing T7 promoter at the start of the 5’ untranslated region (UTR). The plasmid was designed using 427 
the ZIKV isolate BeH819015 (GenBank: KU365778.1) and the amplicon included nts 1-4348, which 428 
covers the 5’ UTR, C, prM, M, E, NS1, and NS2 regions. The qRT-PCR assays were performed in 25 μl 429 
reactions using the SuperScript III platinum One-step qRT-PCR Kit (ThermoFisher) and 2 μl of sample 430 
RNA was used. Amplification was performed following conditions as previously described45. 10-fold 431 
dilutions of the ZIKV RNA transcripts (5 μl/reaction) were used to create a standard curve for 432 
quantification of ZIKV GE/μl of RNA. 433 
Amplicon-based Zika virus sequencing 434 
ZIKV sequencing at TSRI was performed using an amplicon-based approach using the ZikaAsian V1 435 
scheme, as described24. This approach is similar to “RNA jackhammering” to sequence low-quality viral 436 
samples developed by Worobey et al.46. Briefly, cDNA was reverse transcribed from 5 μl of RNA using 437 
SuperScript IV (Invitrogen). ZIKV cDNA (2.5 μl/reaction) was amplified in 35 × 400 bp fragments from 438 
two multiplexed PCR reactions using Q5 DNA High-fidelity Polymerase (New England Biolabs). The 439 
 amplified ZIKV cDNA fragments (50 ng) were prepared for sequencing using the Kapa Hyper prep kit 440 
(Kapa Biosystems) and SureSelect XT2 indexes (Agilent). Agencourt AMPure XP beads (Beckman 441 
Coulter) were used for all purification steps. Paired-end 251 nt reads were generated on the MiSeq using 442 
the V2 500 cycle or V3 600 cycle kits (Illumina). 443 
Trimmomatic was used to remove primer sequences (first 22 nt from the 5’ end of the reads, which is the 444 
maximum length of the primers used for the multiplexed PCR) and bases at both ends with Phred quality 445 
score < 2047. The reads were then aligned to the complete genome of a ZIKV isolate from the Dominican 446 
Republic, 2016 (GenBank: KU853012) using Novoalign v3.04.04 (www.novocraft.com). Samtools was 447 
used to sort the aligned BAM files and to generate alignment statistics48. Snakemake was used as the 448 
workflow management system49. The code and reference indexes for the pipeline can be found at 449 
https://github.com/andersen-lab/zika-pipeline. ZIKV-aligned reads were visually inspected using 450 
Geneious v9.1.550 before generating consensus sequences. A minimum of 3× read-depth coverage, in 451 
support of the consensus, was required to make a base call. 452 
Enrichment-based Zika virus sequencing 453 
ZIKV sequencing at USAMRIID was performed using a targeted enrichment approach. Sequencing 454 
libraries were prepared using the TruSeq RNA Access Library Prep kit (Illumina) with custom ZIKV 455 
probes. The set included 866 unique probes each of which was 80 nt in length (Supplementary Table 2a). 456 
The probes were designed to cover the entire ZIKV genome and to encompass the genetic diversity 457 
present on GenBank on January 14, 2016. In total, 26 ZIKV sequences were used during probe design 458 
(Supplementary Table 2b). Extracted RNA was fragmented at 94 ˚C for 0-60 s and each sample was 459 
enriched separately using a quarter of the reagents specified in the manufacturer’s protocol. Samples were 460 
barcoded, pooled and sequenced using the MiSeq Reagent kit v3 (Illumina) on an Illumina MiSeq with a 461 
minimum of 2 × 151 bp reads. Dual indexing, with no overlapping indices, was used. 462 
The random hexamer associated with read one and the Illumina adaptors were removed from the 463 
sequencing reads using Cutadapt v1.9.dev151, and low-quality reads/bases were filtered using Prinseq-lite 464 
v0.20.352. Reads were aligned to a reference genome (GenBank: KX197192.1) using Bowtie2 v2.0.653, 465 
duplicates were removed with Picard (http://broadinstitute.github.io/picard), and a new consensus was 466 
generated using a combination of Samtools v0.1.1848 and custom scripts 467 
(https://github.com/jtladner/Scripts/blob/master/reference-based_assembly/consensus_fasta.py). Only 468 
bases with Phred quality score ≥ 20 were utilized in consensus calling, and a minimum of 3× read-depth 469 
coverage, in support of the consensus, was required to make a call; positions lacking this depth of 470 
coverage were treated as missing (i.e. called as ‘‘N’’). 471 
Validation and comparison of sequencing methods 472 
The consensus ZIKV sequences from FL01M and FL03M generated by sequencing 35 × 400 bp 473 
amplicons on the MiSeq were validated using the following approaches: 1) sequencing the 35 × 400 bp 474 
amplicons on the Ion S5 platform (ThermoFisher), 2) sequencing amplicons generated using an Ion 475 
AmpliSeq® (ThermoFisher) panel customly targeted towards ZIKV on the Ion S5 platform, and 3) 476 
sequencing 5 × 2,150-2,400 bp ZIKV amplicons on the MiSeq. For Ion library preparation, cDNA was 477 
synthesized using the SuperScript VILO kit (ThermoFisher). ThermoFisher designed 875 custom ZIKV 478 
primers to produce 75 amplicons of ~200 bp in two PCR reactions for use with their Ion AmpliSeq 479 
Library Kit 2.0. The reagent FuPa was used to digest the modified primer sequences after amplification. 480 
The DNA templates were loaded onto Ion 520 chips using the Ion Chef and sequenced on the Ion S5 with 481 
the 200 bp output (ThermoFisher). The 35 × 400 bp amplicons generated for the MiSeq as described 482 
above were introduced into the Ion workflow using the Ion AmpliSeq Library Kit 2.0, but without 483 
fragmentation. Primers to amplify 2,150-2,400 bp ZIKV fragments (Supplementary Table 2c) were kindly 484 
provided by Shelby O’Connor, Dawn Dudly, Dave O’Connor, and Dane Gellerup (AIDS Vaccine 485 
Research Laboratory, University of Wisconsin, Madison). Each fragment was amplified individually by 486 
 PCR using the cDNA generated above, Q5 DNA High-fidelity Polymerase, and the following 487 
thermocycle conditions: 55 ℃ for 30 m, 94 ℃ for 2 m, 35 cycles of 94 ℃ for 15 s, 56 ℃ for 30 s, and 68 488 
℃ for 3.5 m, 68 ℃ for 10 m, and held at 4 ℃ until use. Each PCR product was purified using Agencourt 489 
AMPure XP beads, sheared to 300 to 400 nt fragments using the Covaris S2 sonicator, indexed and 490 
prepared for sequencing as described above, and sequenced using the MiSeq V2 500 cycle kit (paired-end 491 
251 nt reads). Compared to the consensus sequences generated using 35 × 400 bp amplicons on the 492 
MiSeq, there were no consensus-level mismatches in the coding sequence using any of the other three 493 
approaches (Extended Data Table 2). There were, however, some mismatches in the 5’ and 3’ UTRs 494 
(where the genomic RNA is heavily structured), likely a result of PCR bias and decreased coverage depth.  495 
At least 95% of the ZIKV genome was covered from samples with as low as 4 and 9 GE/μl RNA from the 496 
amplicon and enrichment approaches, respectively. These results are similar to our previously determined 497 
clinical range of 10-16 ZIKV GE/μl RNA to achieve at least 95% genome coverage using our amplicon-498 
based approach24. On average, the amplicon-based sequencing approach covered 97% of the ZIKV 499 
genome (≥3× read-depth) and the targeted enrichment approach covered 82% of the ZIKV genome from 500 
clinical samples (Supplementary Table 2d). 501 
Phylogenetic analyses 502 
All published and available complete ZIKV genomes of the Asian genotype from the Pacific and the 503 
Americas were retrieved from GenBank public database as of December 2016. Public sequences (n=65) 504 
were codon-aligned together with ZIKV genomes generated in this study (n=39) using MAFFT54 and 505 
inspected manually. The multiple alignment contained 104 ZIKV sequences collected between 2013 and 506 
2016, from the Pacific (American Samoa, French Polynesia, and Tonga), Brazil, other South and Central 507 
Americas (Guatemala, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela), the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, 508 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Martinique, and Puerto Rico), and the United States (Supplementary File 1). 509 
In order to determine the temporal signal of the sequence dataset, a maximum likelihood (ML) phylogeny 510 
was first reconstructed with PhyML55 using the general time-reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution 511 
model and gamma distributed rates amongst sites56 (Supplementary File 1), which was identified as the 512 
best fitting model for ML inference by jModelTest257. Then, a correlation between root-to-tip genetic 513 
divergence and date of sampling was conducted in TempEst58. 514 
Bayesian phylogenetic analyses were performed using BEAST v.1.8.425 to infer time-structured 515 
phylogenies. We used an SDR06 nucleotide substitution model59 with a non-informative continuous time 516 
Markov chain reference prior (CTMC)60 on the molecular clock rate. Replicate analyses using multiple 517 
combinations of molecular clock and coalescent models were explored to select the best fitting model by 518 
marginal likelihood comparison using path-sampling and stepping-stone estimation approaches61–63 519 
(Extended Data Table 1b). The best fit model was a relaxed molecular clock along with a Bayesian 520 
Skyline model64. All the Bayesian analyses were run for 30 million Markov chain Monte Carlo steps, 521 
sampling parameters and trees every 3000 generations (BEAST XML file and MCC tree available in 522 
Supplementary File 1). Support values for all nodes are embedded in the phylogenetic tree files 523 
(Supplementary File 1). Tree visualizations were generated with baltic (github.com/blab/baltic). 524 
The travel-associated ZIKV genomes add to the Caribbean dataset, but do not directly influence our 525 
conclusions about the source of ZIKV introductions into Florida. 526 
Expected number and distribution of local cases from Zika virus importations 527 
We used branching process theory65,66 to generate the offspring distribution (subsequent local cases) that 528 
is expected from a single introduction. The offspring distribution L is modelled with a negative binomial 529 
distribution with mean R0 and over-dispersion parameter k. The total number of cases j that is caused by a 530 
single importation (including the index case) after an infinite time67 has the following form: 531 
 ܮ = 	
Γ(݆݇ + ݆ − 1)
Γ(݆݇)	Γ(݆ + 1)	
(ܴ଴݇ )
௝ିଵ
(1 + ܴ଴݇ )
௞௝ା௝ିଵ
 
The parameter k represents the variation in the number of secondary cases generated by each case of 532 
ZIKV65. In the case of vector borne diseases, local heterogeneity is high due to a variety of factors such as 533 
mosquito population abundance, human to mosquito interaction, and control interventions68–73. Here, we 534 
assumed high heterogeneity (k=0.1) following previous estimates for vector borne diseases66. This 535 
distribution L is plotted in Extended Data Fig. 4a. For the following, we took a forward simulation 536 
approach, drawing random samples from this distribution. All estimates were based on 100,000 random 537 
simulations. 538 
We used this formula to estimate the probability of observing 241 local cases in Miami-Dade County 539 
alongside 320 travel-associated cases. We approached this by sampling 320 introduction events from L 540 
and calculating the total number of local cases in the resulting outbreak (Extended Data Fig. 4b). We also 541 
calculated the likelihood of observing 241 local cases in the total outbreak (Extended Data Fig. 4c), 542 
finding that the MLE of R0 lies between 0.35 and 0.55. As a sensitivity analysis, we additionally modelled 543 
introductions with the assumption that only 50% of travelers were infectious at time of arrival into 544 
Miami-Dade County, resulting in an MLE of R0 of 0.45–0.8. 545 
We further used this formula to address the probability of observing 3 distinct genetic clusters (F1, F2 and 546 
F3) representing 3 introduction events in a sample of 27 ZIKV genomes from Miami-Dade County. We 547 
approached this by sampling introduction events until we accumulated 241 local cases according to L, 548 
arriving at N introduction events with case counts (j1, j2, … jN). We then sampled 27 cases without 549 
replacement from (j1, j2, … jN) following a hypergeometric distribution and recorded the number of 550 
distinct clusters drawn in the sample. We found that higher values of R0 resulted in fewer distinct clusters 551 
within the sample of 27 genomes (Extended Data Fig. 4d). We additionally calculated the likelihood of 552 
sampling 3 distinct genetic clusters in 27 genomes (Extended Data Fig. 4e), finding an MLE estimate of 553 
R0 of 0.7–0.9. Additionally, as a sensitivity analysis we modelled a preferential sampling process in which 554 
larger clusters are more likely to be drawn from than smaller clusters. Here, we used a parameter α that 555 
enriches the hypergeometric distribution following (j1α, j2α, … jNα). In this case, we found an MLE 556 
estimate of R0 of 0.5–0.9. 557 
Using the overlap of estimates of R0 from local case counts (0.35–0.8) and genetic clusters (0.5–0.9), we 558 
arrived at a 95% uncertainty range of R0 of 0.5–0.8. As an additional sensitivity analysis, we incorporated 559 
under-reporting in which either 50% of travel-associated cases and 25% of local cases are reported or in 560 
which 10% of travel-associated cases and 5% of local cases are reported. We find differential reporting of 561 
travel and local cases results in increased mean R0 estimates when comparing counts of travel-associated 562 
to local cases (Extended Data Figure 4f-g). Additionally, we find that under-reporting increases estimates 563 
of R0 from the sampling analysis (Extended Data Figure 4h-i). Thus, moderate under-reporting is 564 
consistent with R0 estimates of ~0.8. 565 
We additionally perform birth-death stochastic simulations assuming a serial interval with mean 20 566 
days15. We record the number of stochastic simulations still persisting after a particular number of days 567 
for different values of R0 (Fig. 2c). 568 
Zika virus incidence rates 569 
Weekly suspected and confirmed ZIKV case counts from countries and territories within the Americas 570 
with local transmission (January 1 to September 18, 2016) were obtained from the Pan American Health 571 
Organization (PAHO)30. In most cases, the weekly case numbers per country were only reported in bar 572 
graphs. We contacted PAHO multiple times with the hope of gaining access to the raw data included in 573 
 the bar graphs, but our requests were unfortunately denied. Therefore we used WebPlotDigitizer v3.10 574 
(http://arohatgi.info/WebPlotDigitizer) to estimate the numbers. We compared the actual ZIKV case 575 
numbers reported in Ecuador74 (only country with available raw data and reported cases > 10 per week) to 576 
our estimates from the PAHO bar graphs and found that the WebPlotDigitizer was ~99% accurate 577 
(Extended Data Fig. 5a-b).  578 
Country and territory total population sizes to calculate weekly and monthly ZIKV incidence rates were 579 
also obtained from PAHO75. Incidence rates calculated from countries and territories in the Americas 580 
during January to June, 2016 (based on the earliest introduction time estimates until the first known cases) 581 
were used as an estimate for infection likelihood to investigate sources of ZIKV introductions.  582 
Airline and cruise ship traffic 583 
To investigate whether the transmission of ZIKV in Florida coincides with travel patterns from ZIKV 584 
endemic regions, we obtained the number of passengers arriving at airports in Florida via commercial air 585 
travel. We collated flight data from countries and territories in the Americas with local ZIKV 586 
transmission between January and June, 2016 (based on the earliest introduction time estimates until the 587 
first known cases, Supplementary Table 1b), arriving at all commercial airports in Florida. The data were 588 
obtained from the International Air Transportation Association, which collects data on an estimated 90% 589 
of all passenger trips worldwide. Nelson et al.28 previously reported flight data from 33 countries with 590 
ZIKV transmission entering major United States airports during October 2014 through September 2015, 591 
which we used to assess the potential for ZIKV introductions outside of Florida.  592 
Schedules for cruise ships visiting Miami, Port Canaveral, Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale, Key West, 593 
Jacksonville (all in Florida), Houston, Galveston (both in Texas), Charleston (South Carolina) and New 594 
Orleans (Louisiana) ports in the year 2016 were collated from www.cruisett.com and confirmed by cross-595 
referencing ship logs reported by Port of Miami and reported ship schedules from 596 
www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/. Scheduled cruise ship capacities were extracted from 597 
www.cruisemapper.com. Every country/territory with ZIKV transmission visited by a cruise ship 10 days 598 
(the approximate mean time to ZIKV clearance in human blood [i.e., the infectious period])76 prior to 599 
arrival was counted as contributing the ship’s capacity worth of passengers to Miami to the month of 600 
arrival (Supplementary Table 1b). While the air traffic was based on the reported number of travelers, we 601 
estimated the sea traffic by ship capacity. Lee and Ramdeen77 reported that the average occupancy of 602 
cruise ships traveling to the Caribbean Islands exceeded 100% in 2011, and according to the Florida-603 
Caribbean Cruise Association78, it remained >100% in 2015. Occupancy data for 2016 was not available 604 
at the time of publication, but we assumed that it was also near 100%.  605 
Expected number of travelers infected with Zika virus 606 
We estimated the expected number of travelers entering Miami who were infected with ZIKV (λ) by 607 
using the total travel capacity (C) and the likelihood of ZIKV infection (infections (I) per person (N)) 608 
from each country/territory (i): 609 
ߣ = 	෍ܥ௜
ܫ௜
௜ܰ௜
 
We summed the number of expected infected travelers from each country/territory with ZIKV 610 
transmission by region and travel method (flights or cruises). The number of ZIKV cases reported by each 611 
country are likely under-estimates in part because the majority of ZIKV infections are asymptomatic2,31. 612 
We normalized some of the potential reporting variances between countries by reporting the data as the 613 
relative proportion of infected travelers (Fig. 3c, Extended Data Fig. 7a) and as the absolute number of 614 
infected travelers (Fig. 3d, Extended Data Fig. 7b, Supplementary Table 1b) from each region. We also 615 
accounted for potential reporting biases with incidence rates by using ZIKV attack rates (i.e., proportion 616 
 infected before epidemic burnout) to estimate peak transmission intensity. Attack rates were calculated 617 
using a susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) transmission model derived from seroprevalence studies 618 
and environmental factors as described79. Using attack rates as an estimate of infection likelihood, we 619 
predict that ~60% of the infected travelers entering Miami came from the Caribbean (Extended Data 7b), 620 
which is in agreement with our methods using incidence rates of ~60-70% (Fig. 3c). A list of countries 621 
and territories used in these analyses can be found in Supplementary Table 1b. 622 
Maps 623 
The maps presented in our figures were generated using Matplotlib80 and ESRI basemaps 624 
(www.esri.com/data/basemaps). The software and basemaps are open source and “freely available to 625 
anyone”. 626 
Data availability 627 
All ZIKV sequencing data is available under the NCBI BioProjects PRJNA342539 and PRJNA356429. 628 
Individual sample GenBank access numbers are listed in Supplementary Table 1a. All other data is 629 
available in the Extended Data, Supplemental Information, or upon request. 630 
 631 
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 Extended Data 634 
Extended Data Fig. 1 | Miami-Dade mosquito surveillance and relative Aedes aegypti abundance. (a) 635 
Mosquito surveillance data reported from June 21 to November 28, 2016 was used to evaluate the risk of 636 
ZIKV infection from mosquito-borne transmission in Miami. A total of 24,306 Ae. aegypti and 45 Ae. 637 
albopictus were collected. Trap nights are the total number of times each trap site was used and the trap 638 
locations are shown in Fig. 1d (some “Other Miami” trap sites are located outside of mapped region). Up 639 
to 50 mosquitoes of the same species and trap night were pooled together for ZIKV RNA testing. The 640 
infection rates were calculated using a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). None of the Ae. albopictus 641 
pools contained ZIKV RNA. (b) The number of weekly ZIKV cases (based on symptoms onset) was 642 
correlated with mean Ae. aegypti abundance per trap night determined from the same week and zone 643 
(Spearman r = 0.61). This suggests that when the virus is present, mosquito abundance numbers alone 644 
could be used to target control efforts. (c) Insecticide usage, including truck and aerial adulticides and 645 
larvacides, by the Miami-Dade Mosquito Control in Wynwood (left) and Miami Beach (right) was 646 
overlaid with Ae. aegypti abundance per trap night to demonstrate that intense usage of insecticides may 647 
have helped to reduce local mosquito populations. (d) Relative Ae. aegypti abundance for each Florida 648 
county and month was estimated using a multivariate regression model, demonstrating spatial and 649 
temporal heterogeneity for the risk of ZIKV infection.  650 
 651 
Extended Data Fig. 2 | Maximum likelihood tree and root-to-tip regression of Zika virus genomes 652 
from Pacific islands and the epidemic in Americas. (a) Maximum likelihood tree of publicly available 653 
ZIKV sequences and sequences generated in this study (n=104). tips are coloured by location, labels in 654 
bold indicate sequences generated in this study, Florida clusters F1-F4 are indicated by vertical lines to 655 
the right of the tree. Bootstrap support values are shown at key nodes. All other support values can be 656 
found in Supplementary File 1. (b) Linear regression of sample tip dates against divergence from root 657 
based on sequences with known collection dates estimates an evolutionary rate for the ZIKV phylogeny 658 
of 1.10×10-3 nucleotide substitutions/site/year (subs/site/yr). This is consistent with BEAST analyses 659 
using a relaxed molecular clock and a Bayesian Skyline tree prior, the best-performing combination of 660 
clock and demographic model according to marginal likelihood estimates (Extended Data Table 1c), 661 
which estimated an evolutionary rate of 1.21×10-3 (95% highest posterior density: 1.01 - 1.43×10-3) 662 
subs/site/yr (Extended Data Table 1a). These values are in agreement with previous estimates calculated 663 
based on ZIKV genomes from Brazil6. 664 
 665 
Extended Data Fig. 3 | Molecular clock dating of Zika virus clades. Maximum clade credibility 666 
(MCC) tree of ZIKV genomes collected from Pacific islands and the epidemic in Americas (n=104). 667 
Circles at the tips are colored based on origin location. Clade posterior probabilities are indicated by 668 
white circles filled with black relative to the support. A posterior probability of 1 fills the entire circle 669 
black. The grey violin plot indicates the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) interval for the tMRCA of 670 
the American epidemic. We estimated that the tMRCA for the ongoing epidemic in the Americas 671 
occurred during October, 2013 (node AM, Extended Table 1, 95% HPD: August, 2013-January, 2014), 672 
which is consistent with previous analysis based on ZIKV genomes from Brazil6. 673 
 674 
Extended Data Fig. 4 | Estimation of basic reproductive number and number of introductions in 675 
Miami-Dade County. (a) Probability distribution of estimated total number of cases caused by a single 676 
introduction (excluding the index case) for different values of R0. (b) Mean and 95% CI for total number 677 
of local cases caused by 320 introduction events (i.e., travel-associated cases diagnosed in Miami-Dade 678 
County) for different values of R0 and for different assumptions of proportion of infectious travelers. (c) 679 
Log likelihood of observing 241 local cases in Miami-Dade County with 320 introduction events for 680 
different values of R0 along with 95% maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) bounds on R0. (d) Mean and 681 
95% uncertainty interval for total number of distinct phylogenetic clusters observed in 27 sequenced 682 
ZIKV genomes from human cases diagnosed in Miami-Dade County for different values of R0 and for 683 
 different assumptions of sampling bias, from α=1 (no sampling bias) to α=2 (skewed toward 684 
preferentially sampling larger clusters). (e) Log likelihood of observing 3 clusters (i.e., ZIKV lineages F1, 685 
F2, and F4, Fig. 2a) in 27 sequenced cases for different values of R0 along with 95% MLE bounds on R0. 686 
(f) Mean and 95% CI for total number of local cases caused by 320 observed travel-associated cases with 687 
travel-associated vs local reporting rates of 50%/25% and 10%/5%. This assumes 50% of travelers are 688 
infectious. (g) Log likelihood of observing 241 local cases with 320 introduction events for different 689 
values of R0 along with 95% MLE bounds on R0 with travel-associated vs local reporting rates of 690 
50%/25% and 10%/5%. (h) Mean and 95% uncertainty interval for total number of distinct phylogenetic 691 
clusters observed in 27 sequenced ZIKV genomes for different values of R0 and for assumptions of local 692 
reporting rate of 5% and 25%. This assumes preferential sampling (α=2). (i) Log likelihood of observing 693 
3 clusters in 27 sequenced cases for different values of R0 along with 95% MLE bounds on R0 with local 694 
reporting rate of 5% and 25%. At 5% local reporting rate, 0 of the 100,000 replicates for all R0 values 695 
showed 3 clusters. 696 
 697 
Extended Data Fig. 5 | Weekly reported Zika virus case numbers and incidence rates in the 698 
Americas. (a) Most ZIKV case numbers reported by PAHO30 were only available as bar graphs (raw data 699 
was not made available to us at the time of request). Therefore we used the WebPlotDigitizer to estimate 700 
the weekly case numbers from the PAHO bar graphs. ZIKV cases reported from Ecuador was the only 701 
data set to include a link to the actual case numbers that also had >10 cases per week74. To validate the 702 
WebPlotDigitizer, we compared the weekly reported case numbers from Ecuador to our estimates. (b) 703 
The reported and estimated case numbers were strongly correlated (Spearman r = 0.9981). The 704 
WebPlotDigitizer was used to estimate the ZIKV case numbers for all subsequent analysis. (c) ZIKV 705 
cases (suspected and confirmed) and (d) incidence rates (normalized per 100,000 population) are shown 706 
for each country or territory with available data per epidemiological week from January 1 to September 707 
18, 2016. (e) Each country or territory with available data is colored by its reported ZIKV incidence rate 708 
from January to June, 2016 (the time frame for analysis of ZIKV introductions into Florida). 709 
 710 
Extended Data Fig. 6 | Cruise and flight traffic entering Miami from regions with Zika virus 711 
transmission. The estimated number of passengers entering Miami, by either (a) cruises or (b) flights, 712 
from each country or territory in the Americas with ZIKV transmission per month (left panel). The center 713 
map and inset show the cumulative numbers of travelers entering Miami during January to June, 2016 714 
(the time frame for analysis of ZIKV introductions into Florida) from each country or territory per method 715 
of travel. (c) The total traffic (i.e. cruises and flights) is shown entering Miami per month. 716 
 717 
Extended Data Fig. 7 | Expected number of Zika virus infected travelers from the Caribbean is 718 
correlated with the total observed number of travel-associated infections. (a) In order to account for 719 
potential biases in ZIKV reporting accuracies, we also estimated the proportion of infected travelers using 720 
projected ZIKV attack rates79 (i.e. predicted proportion of population infected before epidemic burnout). 721 
About 60% of the infected travelers are expected to have arrived from the Caribbean, similar to our 722 
results using incidence rates (Fig. 3c). (b) The expected number of travel-associated ZIKV cases were 723 
estimated by the number of travelers coming into Miami from each country/territory (travel capacity) and 724 
the in-country/territory infection likelihood (incidence rate per person) per week. The expected travel 725 
cases were summed from all of the Americas (left), Caribbean (left center), South America (right center), 726 
and Central America (right) and plotted with the observed travel-associated ZIKV cases. Numbers in each 727 
plot indicate Spearman correlation coefficients. Negative Spearman r coefficients indicated a negative 728 
correlation between the number of expected and observed travel cases.  729 
 730 
Extended Data Fig. 8 | Greater early season potential for Zika virus introductions into Miami.  The 731 
monthly cruise ship and airline28 capacity from countries/territories with ZIKV transmission for the major 732 
United States travel hubs (shown as circle diameter) with monthly potential Ae. aegypti abundance (circle 733 
color), as previously estimated22. The abundance ranges were chosen with respect to the May-Oct Miami 734 
 mean: “None to low” (<2%), “Low to moderate” (2-25%), “Moderate to high (25-75%), and “High” 735 
(>75%). Mosquito-borne transmission is unlikely in the “None to low” range. Cruise capacities from 736 
Houston and Galveston, Texas were combined.  737 
 738 
Extended Data Table 1 | (a) Time of the most recent common ancestor and evolutionary rate and 739 
(b) Model selection to infer time-structured phylogenies.  740 
HPD, highest posterior density. Dates listed as proportion of days elapsed with a year. Clades refer to Fig. 741 
2a.  742 
 743 
Extended Data Table 2 | Validation of sequencing results. 744 
a Compared to the consensus genomes generated by sequencing 35 × 400 bp amplicons on the MiSeq. 745 
b Amplicons produced using Ion AmpliSeq and 875 custom ZIKV primers. 746 
NGS, next-generation sequencing; UTR, untranslated region; CDS, coding sequence. 747 
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